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 477 
Ay Dios NSMIA!1  
PROOF OF A PRIVATE OFFERING EXEMPTION SHOULD 
NOT BE A PRECONDITION FOR PREEMPTING BLUE SKY 
LAW UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITIES 
MARKETS IMPROVEMENT ACT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, both federal and state securities law have 
governed the purchase and sale of securities since 1933.2 This two-tiered 
regulatory scheme is often criticized for being unnecessarily complex 
and redundant, inefficient, and expensive for issuers.3 “Issuers,” such as 
large corporations, small business owners, and investment companies, 
typically sell securities, like stocks and bonds, in order to raise capital for 
business growth or investment. In order to sell securities to the general 
public, issuers must typically comply with multifarious registration 
requirements. Such requirements include submitting securities 
registration forms, financial disclosures, and fees to state regulatory 
agencies and the federal Securities Exchange Commission (“S.E.C.” or 
“Commission”).4 Even if issuers comply, some states refuse to allow the 
  
 
1
 NSMIA refers to the National Securities Markets Improvement Act and is pronounced 
“NIZ.mee.uh.” Jed Horowitz, No More Blue Skies? Lawyers Are Scrambling for New Angles, 
ONWALLSTREET.COM, Sept. 1, 1998 (on file with author).  
 
2
 The Securities Act of 1933 introduced federal securities regulation to a securities 
market already regulated by state securities law. See infra Part II. 
 
3
 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-864, at 39 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3920 (“[T]he system of dual Federal and state securities regulation has resulted in a 
degree of duplicative and unnecessary regulation. Securities offerings and the brokers and dealers 
engaged in securities transactions are all currently subject to a dual system of regulation that, in 
many instances, is redundant, costly, and ineffective.”); Roberta S. Karmel, Blue-Sky Merit 
Regulation: Benefit to Investors or Burden on Commerce, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 107 (1987) (“The 
federal-state-[Securities Self-Regulatory Organization] system of securities regulation does not have 
a well articulated allocation of responsibilities and priorities. It involves conflicting philosophies and 
considerable overlap and duplication.”).  
 
4
 See Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional 
Preemption Failure, 22 J. CORP. L. 175, 185 (1997) (“Immediately prior to [NSMIA], [state 
securities] laws generally required that securities offered . . . within a particular state must be 
registered with the state’s securities division . . . . This broad rule, of course, is duplicative of the 
fundamental registration rule in the 1933 Act.”). Examples of current securities registration forms 
include New York’s form M-11 for non-exempt securities or Form 99 for exempt securities under 
NSMIA. INVESTOR PROTECTION BUREAU, INDEX OF INVESTOR FORMS BY CATEGORY, 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/ investors/form_categ.html. Each form includes a schedule of fees to be 
paid. Id.  
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sale of securities that do not meet minimum quality or merit standards.5 
The process of complying with these registration and merit requirements 
can become prohibitively expensive, especially for smaller issuers.6 
In October 1996, Congress—drawing upon its constitutional 
authority to preempt state law7—abrogated some of the states’ regulatory 
authority over securities by enacting the National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act (“NSMIA”).8 Congress intended to streamline the 
regulation of national securities markets by federalizing the registration 
and regulation of several types of securities, like those listed on national 
securities exchanges.9 NSMIA also preempts state securities laws 
regulating certain private offerings of securities already exempt from 
federal registration.10 However, such an innovative solution for securities 
markets did not develop without a concomitant set of novel complexities.  
Issuers selling securities in “private offerings” (also called 
“private placements”) lack clear instruction as to when, and under what 
circumstances, they are no longer obligated to comply with state 
securities regulations. Unless NSMIA specifically exempts a class of 
securities from state regulation, state regulation of those securities is not 
preempted and continues to bind issuers.11 Securities qualifying for the 
  
 
5
 For example, state merit standards could disallow the sale of securities if the price 
were too high, if the underwriter fees or costs of sale were too high, or if purchasers’ voting rights 
would not have parity with voting rights of other classes of shareholders. See MERIT STANDARDS 
FOR SECURITIES OFFERINGS (Ohio Dep’t of Commerce), available at http://www.securities.state.oh.us/ 
Rules/Existing_Guidelines.aspx#DS (last visited Jan. 8, 2007).  
 
6
 See Campbell, supra note 4, at 181. In addition to registration fees charged by the 
state, an issuer’s expenses include “legal and accounting costs generated by extensive narrative and 
financial disclosure requirements in a registered offering.” Id. at n.32.  
 
7
 The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution permits Congress to preempt 
state law simply by regulating the same subject matter. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Cheryl 
Nichols, The Importance of Selective Federal Preemption in the U.S. Securities Regulatory 
Framework: A Lesson From Canada, Our Neighbor to the North, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 391, 396 (2006) 
(summarizing the role of the Supremacy Clause in preemption of state securities law). State law is 
automatically “preempted,” and is subverted to federal law, wherever a conflict exists between state 
and federal law. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005) (“The Supremacy Clause 
unambiguously provides that if there is any conflict between federal and state law, federal law shall 
prevail . . . . It is beyond peradventure that federal power over commerce is ‘superior to that of the 
States to provide for the welfare or necessities of their inhabitants,’ however legitimate or dire those 
necessities may be.”) (citation omitted). 
 
8
 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (hereinafter “NSMIA”), Pub. L. 
No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416, 3416 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2006)). 
 
9
 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A); see H.R. REP. 104-622, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, at 3878 
(1996) (stating that the purpose of NSMIA is to “designat[e] the Federal government as the 
exclusive regulator of national offerings of securities”). National securities exchanges include larger 
exchanges like New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A). 
 
10
 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D); see H.R. REP. 104-622, supra note 9, at 3895 (“The 
Committee intends that the [Securities Act of 1933] section 4(2) exemption from State regulation 
facilitate private placement of securities consistent with the public interest and the protection of 
investors.”). 
 
11
 See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c) (limiting the scope of preemption by leaving states the 
authority to regulate offerings of securities that are completely intra-state); H.R. REP. 104-622, supra 
note 9, at 3878 (“State governments generally retain authority to regulate small, regional, or 
intrastate securities offerings, and to bring actions pursuant to State laws and regulations prohibiting 
fraud and deceit, including broker-dealer sales practices abuses.”); see also Campbell, supra note 4, 
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federal Rule 506 “private offering” exemption comprise one category of 
securities that NSMIA exempts from state securities laws.12 However, the 
complexity and fragility of a Rule 506 exemption render it unworkable 
as a basis for preempting state law.  
Rule 506 of Regulation D—one of several, objective exemption 
rules issued in the 1980s under the Securities Act of 1933—provides a 
regulatory exemption from federal registration for any offer of securities 
that is “non-public,” or “private.”13 An “exemption” is valuable to issuers 
because it excuses the issuer from the expensive and complex 
registration and disclosure processes involved in public offerings of 
securities.14 Private offerings were exempt from federal registration 
before NSMIA was enacted, but they were not necessarily exempt from 
state registration and merit regulation.15 NSMIA now preempts state 
regulation of Rule 506 private offerings.16  
Although Rule 506 provides an objective standard for securing a 
private offering exemption under the Securities Act,17 it provides an 
unreasonably complex and untenable standard for preempting state 
securities regulation. More than a decade following the passage of 
NSMIA, courts have yet to agree whether an issuer claiming a Rule 506 
exemption must prove the exemption in order to demonstrate that 
NSMIA has preempted state law.18 Resolving this issue is important to 
issuers because Rule 506 creates an elusive and mercurial exemption, 
one that may become invalid months after the securities are offered for 
sale without regard for state regulation.19 If state law is automatically 
revived after a private offering exemption is lost, states would regain 
  
at 204-05 (Although certain smaller offerings may be exempt from federal registration under 
Regulation A and Rules 504 and 505 of Regulation D, NSMIA does not preempt state regulation of 
these offerings.). 
 
12
 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006) (providing a registration exemption for offers of securities 
“not involving any public offering”); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a) (2008) (providing to issuers a “safe 
harbor” for engaging in private offers of securities, criteria that, if met, would guarantee an 
exemption from registration under § 4(2) of the Securities Act).  
 
13
 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. Private offers of securities include offers to 
banks, investment companies, wealthy individuals, and other financially sophisticated and accredited 
investors. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501, 506 (2008) (defining a class of “accredited investors” to whom 
issuers could offer securities while maintaining an exemption from federal registration). For a 
discussion of the Regulation D rules and § 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, see infra Part III(A). 
 
14
 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2). 
 
15
 See Temple v. Gorman, 201 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1242 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (“Until 1996, 
both federal and state regulations governed securities offerings.”). 
 
16
 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D). 
 
17
 The requirements for a private offering exemption under The Securities Act of 1933 
are highly subjective. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. 
 
18
 1 STUART R. COHN, SECURITIES COUNSELING FOR SMALL AND EMERGING 
COMPANIES § 6:24.50 (2007); see 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4). 
 
19
 In one case, a trial court found that two separate offers two months apart were legally 
“integrated,” or treated as a single offer. See Reply Brief of Appellants Christopher C. Brown & 
Funeral.com, Inc., at 24, Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, Inc., 733 N.W.2d 827, No. A06-1233 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2007), 2006 WL 4723912. This means that the issuer lost its valid Rule 506 exemption on the 
first offer after making the second non-exempt offer. Id.  
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jurisdiction to impose remedies for securities violations ex post. The 
vestige of state regulatory authority over securities obfuscates the private 
placement issuer’s duties and liabilities under state law. 
This Note evaluates the two preemption standards adopted under 
differing judicial interpretations of NSMIA. The “broad” preemption 
standard does not require an issuer to prove a valid Rule 506 exemption 
in order to claim an exemption from state law under NSMIA. This 
standard was first adopted by a federal district court in Temple v. 
Gorman and was most recently reaffirmed by the Minnesota Court of 
Appeals in Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, Inc.20 The “narrow” preemption 
standard requires proof of a valid Rule 506 exemption before a court will 
preempt state law under NSMIA. The narrow standard was first iterated 
by the Alabama Supreme Court in Buist v. Time Domain Corp. and was 
recently adopted by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Brown v. 
Earthboard Sports USA, Inc.21 The S.E.C. can best resolve this issue by 
adopting a safe harbor that would guarantee issuers an exemption from 
state securities regulation upon filing a notice of the exempt offering 
with the state. 
Part II of this Note provides the relevant statutory context for 
these decisions. It begins by illustrating the development and 
disintegration of the dual regulatory system. Part III provides two 
relevant examples of policy changes attempting to rebalance investor 
protections with regulatory efficiency, objectivity, and simplicity: 
Regulation D NSMIA. Part IV examines the practical consequences of 
these judicial interpretations of NSMIA by reviewing case law. Finally, 
Part V concludes that a broader standard is more consistent with the 
intent of Congress and can add efficiency, objectivity, and simplicity to 
securities regulation.  
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DUAL-REGULATORY SYSTEM 
The term “dual-regulatory system” refers, in this context, to the 
two levels of regulatory agencies governing the purchase and sale of 
securities in the United States.22 The two-tiered system is the result of the 
independent developments of state and federal securities laws in the 19th 
and early 20th centuries.23 The following sections discuss the evolution 
  
 
20
 733 N.W.2d 827, 832 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007); Temple, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 1243-44; 
accord Pinnacle Commc’ns Int’l, Inc. v. Am. Family Mortgage Corp., 417 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1087 
(D. Minn. 2006); Lillard v. Stockton, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1116 (N.D. Okla. 2003). 
 
21
 481 F.3d 901, 909-10 (6th Cir. 2007); Buist v. Time Domain Corp., 926 So.2d 290, 
298 (Ala. 2005); accord In re Blue Flame Energy Corp., 871 N.E.2d 1227, 1244 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2006); Grubka v. WebAccess Int’l, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1270 (D. Colo. 2006); Hamby v. 
Clearwater Consulting Concepts, LLP, 428 F. Supp. 2d 915, 921 (E.D. Ark. 2006).  
 
22
 Karmel, supra note 3, at 107.  
 
23
 See generally Ernest W. Walker & Beverly Bailey Hadaway, Merit Standards 
Revisited: An Empirical Analysis of the Efficacy of Texas Merit Standards, 7 J. CORP. L. 651, 651-52 
(1982) (summarizing the history of federal and state securities law enactments).  
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of federal and state regulation of securities in the United States, which 
provides the historical underpinnings of Regulation D and NSMIA.  
A. Blue Sky Law  
Securities regulation and investor protection are old concepts 
predating the United States. The Bubble Act of 1720 in Britain is one 
early example of an investor protection law, which purported to protect 
investors by outlawing certain fraudulent activities of large merchants.24 
By the time Congress passed the first federal securities law in 1933,25 
state legislatures had long assumed a role in securities regulation, some 
since the mid-19th century.26 Like the Bubble Act, the first securities and 
commodities regulations came about at a time when highly speculative 
and fraudulent investment offers had spread ubiquitously in the United 
States.27 This urged state legislatures to pass laws and regulations 
protecting investors from fraudulent and high-risk securities.28 
In 1911, Kansas became the first state to enact such securities 
laws, which became known as “blue sky” laws.29 Blue sky laws are 
primarily intended to curb securities fraud.30 They also promote 
dissemination of information to investors by providing for mandatory 
disclosures.31 The Kansas statute established registration requirements for 
all offers of securities and licenses for all firms selling securities.32 
Registration of securities involved filing a copy of the security, along 
  
 
24
 Jeffrey T. Haughey & Kevin M. Veler, Blue Sky Laws and State Takeover Statutes: 
New Importance for an Old Battleground, 7 J. CORP. L. 689, 693-94 (1982). The Bubble Act 
responded to wild fluctuations in the market price of British and French merchant companies, a 
financial crisis attributed to the companies’ sales of subscriptions in fraudulent enterprises. See id.  
 
25
 Id. at 697.  
 
26
 See Christopher R. Lane, Halting the March Toward Preemption: Resolving Conflicts 
Between State and Federal Securities Regulators, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 317, 321 (2005) (citing 
Massachusetts law regulating the minimum par value of railroad company shares as of 1852).  
  Commodities exchanges had also been regulated since the 19th century in reaction to 
speculative trading. Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling? 
Derivative Securities and Financial Futures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86 
NW. U. L. REV. 987, 1013-14 (1992). 
 
27
 Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. 
REV. 347, 355 (1991) (“The public’s growing appetite for speculative securities sparked intense 
public concern about fraudulent promotions.”); Mark A. Sargent, Report on State Merit Regulation 
of Securities Offerings, 41 BUS. LAW. 785, 792 (1986) (“[The early blue sky laws] reflected, 
primarily, a strong sense of the ordinary person’s vulnerability to securities fraud.”).  
 
28
 Hazen, supra note 26, at 1013-14; Lane, supra note 26, at 321. 
 
29
 Sargent, supra note 27, at 791, 792 n.34. A “blue sky law” refers to “[a] state statute 
establishing standards for offering and selling securities, the purpose being to protect citizens from 
investing in fraudulent schemes or unsuitable companies.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 183 (8th ed. 
2004). The precise origin of the term “blue sky” is debatable, but the term is commonly believed to 
refer to speculative and fraudulent sales of the “blue sky” to gullible investors. Hazen, supra note 26, 
at 1020 n.180; but see Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 359 n.59 (arguing that “blue sky” was used 
commonly in 1910, but no one using it ever defined it, so Kansans probably used the term to refer to 
other speculative or fraudulent activity before using it with respect to securities). 
 
30
 Hazen, supra note 26, at 1014. 
 
31
 See Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 394-95. 
 
32
 See id. at 359-62.  
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with copies of financial statements and business plans, with the state 
banking commissioner.33 Blue sky laws also required periodic financial 
reports and disclosures for any firm offering or selling securities in 
Kansas.34  
Merit review was also a significant feature of Kansas’ first blue 
sky law.35 Merit review refers to the state’s ability to deny intra-state 
sales of securities for a variety of reasons, like if the offer contains unfair 
terms, if the security does not promise a fair return, or if the issuer is 
insolvent or dishonest.36 Kansas empowered the bank commissioner to 
perform stringent merit reviews for securities sold within the state in 
order to stem the proliferation of unscrupulous businesses cozening 
ignorant investors out of their money.37  
By 1913, twenty-four states had adopted blue sky laws,38 and 
many states copied the Kansas statute in adopting merit review.39 In 
1917, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
these laws, finding that they fell within the states’ police powers.40 
Today, every state has adopted some form of blue sky law.41 Most blue 
sky laws are modeled after the Uniform Securities Act,42 a model code 
attempting to harmonize differences in early state securities regulations.43 
Only a minority of states stringently enforces merit reviews.44  
  
 
33
 See id. at 361.  
 
34
 See id. at 359-62.  
 
35
 Haughey & Veler, supra note 24, at 696. 
 
36
 See, e.g., id. at 802-05 (discussing several of the bases on which states deny intra-state 
offers and sales of securities). 
 
37
 Id. at 696 (noting that, under the 1911 Kansas blue sky merit regulations the bank 
commissioner approved only 100 of the 1400 to 1500 applications received in the first year and a 
half). 
 
38
 Haughey & Veler, supra note 24, at 696. 
 
39
 Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 377-78. The other states adopting strict merit 
requirements were Arkansas, Idaho, Michigan, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
and West Virginia, primarily agrarian states without the investment banking activity found in states 
that rejected merit requirements. Id. at 377-80. 
 
40
 See Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568, 586 (1917) (“[T]he judgment is for 
the State to make, and in the belief of evils and the necessity for their remedy and the manner of 
their remedy the State has determined that the business of dealing in securities shall have 
administrative supervision, and 26 states have expressed like judgments.”); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls 
Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559, 568 (1917) (deferring to the Court’s decision in Hall v. Geiger-Jones 
Co.); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 555 (1917) (“Whatever detriment may come from 
such [speculative] judgments the law may be powerless to prevent; but against counterfeits of value 
the law can give protection, and such is the purpose of the [“blue sky”] statute under review.”); see 
also Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 387 (noting that, as a result of the Supreme Court’s holdings 
in the “Blue Sky Cases” of 1917 states were to free to regulate securities without issue as to the 
constitutionality of such legislation or regulation). 
 
41
 See Haughey & Veler, supra note 24, at 702. 
 
42
  UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101 (2005). 
 
43
 See Haughey & Veler, supra note 24, at 702. 
 
44
 Macey & Miller, supra note 27, at 389. 
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B. Federal Securities Regulation 
Congress did not begin regulating securities or securities markets 
until 1933, during the Great Depression.45 In a series of congressional 
hearings held on the 1933 Securities Act, Congress recognized that state 
regulators had failed to prevent the stock market crash in 1929.46 The 
stock market crash was exacerbated by speculative investments and gross 
over-valuations of worthless securities, which blue sky laws were 
supposed to prevent.47 States had limited jurisdiction, however, in that 
they were unable to effectively regulate interstate securities 
transactions.48 Additionally, some states performed their delegated 
regulatory functions more efficaciously than others.49  
The 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act 
serve primarily to police securities fraud and promote the full disclosure 
and distribution of material information to the market.50 Congress did not 
adopt the merit regulations present in many blue sky laws, but instead 
adopted a policy of full disclosure to protect investors.51  
The disclosure rules contained in the Securities and Exchange 
Acts, however, are far more voluminous and demanding than the 
disclosures required by most blue sky laws modeled after the Uniform 
Securities Act.52 The purpose of disclosure is to provide information to 
investors. A fully informed investor is believed to be able to protect 
himself or herself from potential risks and fraud better than the 
government.53 Justice Louis Brandeis famously summarized this theory 
of disclosure when he wrote that “[s]unlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”54  
Despite the failures of blue sky laws and the addition of federal 
regulations, the Securities Act, as originally drafted, preserved the states’ 
concurrent jurisdiction over securities.55 The Securities Act has been 
amended several times since 1933, but none of these amendments would 
  
 
45
 See Haughey & Veler, supra note 24, at 697. 
 
46
 Lane, supra note 26, at 323-24. 
 
47
 Id. 
 
48
 Karmel, supra note 3, at 111 (citing Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) 
(holding that blue sky regulation of interstate rather than intrastate securities transactions is 
unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce)). 
 
49
 Lane, supra note 26, at 324. 
 
50
 Haughey and Veler, supra note 24, at 698-700. 
 
51
 Id. at 698. 
 
52
 Mark A. Sargent, State Disclosure Regulation and the Allocation of Regulatory 
Responsibilities, 46 MD. L. REV. 1027, 1030 (1987). 
 
53
 Haughey & Veler, supra note 24, at 698-700 (quoting Robert I. Millonzi, Concurrent 
Regulation of Interstate Securities Issues: The Need for Congressional Reappraisal, 49 VA. L. REV. 
1483, 1492 (1963)). 
 
54
 LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 
92 (1914). 
 
55
 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1994) (“Nothing in this subchapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the 
securities commission (or any agency or office performing like functions) of any State or Territory 
of the United States, or the District of Columbia, over any security or any person.”). 
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significantly curtail state regulatory authority over securities for over six 
decades.56 
C. Efficacy of the Dual Regulatory System 
Some commentators have urged that state securities registration 
requirements and blue sky merit and quality regulations are ineffective in 
protecting investors and burdensome on efficient capital formation.57 
Each state’s securities laws have developed differently, and this has 
engendered some discord between blue sky laws.58 Even states adopting 
the Uniform Securities Act have modified the uniform act’s provisions.59 
Additionally, states have developed different interpretations of the blue 
sky law provisions they adopted,60 although the provisions may be 
textually similar. Such variations with regard to merit requirements and 
quality standards for registration have undermined the intent of the 
Uniform Securities Act to achieve regulatory uniformity.61 
Other commentators have argued that the rules for registering 
most securities in most states are similar, despite the lack of perfect 
uniformity, and coordinate well with federal registration rules.62 
However, some states have historically enforced their merit and quality 
provisions much more stringently than others.63 Moreover, differences in 
regulation are most evident when issuers claim federal exemptions from 
registration or are offering securities with substantial risk.64 These 
  
 
56
 See, e.g., Regulation D—Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of Securities 
Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, Preliminary Notes, 17 C.F.R. § 230 (2008) 
(hereinafter Preliminary Notes, Regulation D) (“Nothing in these rules obviates the need to comply 
with any applicable state law relating to the offer and sale of securities.”); Preliminary Notes, 17 
C.F.R. § 230.144A (2008) (A regulatory exemption for securities resold privately to institutions 
notes that “[n]othing in this section obviates the need for any person to comply with any applicable 
state law relating to the offer or sale of securities.”). 
 
57
 See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 3, at 107, 117-18 (arguing that merit regulation burdens 
interstate commerce and capital formation by restricting how issuers set prices and compensate 
underwriters); but see Sargent, supra note 52, at 1031-34 (arguing that state merit reviews rarely 
result in the inability to sell the securities, and when they do, issuers typically “withdraw the 
application for registration and sell around that state.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
58
 See Haughey & Veler, supra note 24, at 701-02. 
 
59
 See id.  
 
60
 See id. 
 
61
 See id. 
 
62
 Sargent, supra note 52, at 1030-32 (stating that most state securities acts are based on 
a uniform act and contain exemptions from registration that are similar to the federal exemptions). 
 
63
 See, e.g., Jay T. Brandi, Securities Practitioners and Blue Sky Laws: A Survey of 
Comments and a Ranking of States by Stringency of Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 689, 703-04 (1985) 
(According to one study in the 1980s, attorneys typically found Texas, California, and Wisconsin to 
be among the most “stringent” regulators of merit standards for securities.).  
 
64
 Sargent, supra note 52, at 1035 (noting that some states will not scrutinize any issue of 
securities that is registered with the S.E.C. and that some states will carefully scrutinize issues of 
certain highly speculative securities). 
  Many states adopted a model state exemption for offers exempt from federal 
registration under Regulation D, the Uniform Limited Offering Exemption. Id. at 1032 n.25. Like the 
Uniform Securities Act, not all states adopted it, and many states that had adopted the ULOE had 
modified it. See S.E.C., REPORT ON THE UNIFORMITY OF STATE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR 
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variations sustained a specialty market for blue sky lawyers,65 but they 
added to the tremendous costs of complying with federal registration and 
disclosure regulations.66  
The development of the dual-regulatory system governing 
securities illustrates that national securities markets must be regulated to 
protect investors. Indeed, both state and federal securities regulations 
were developed during financial crises, when investors had been injured 
by market failures.67 However, it also illustrates the inefficiencies, 
inefficacies, and complexities appurtenant to securities regulation in the 
United States. The development of uniform and model state codes and 
exemptions were state and private sector responses to the difficulty of 
selling securities nationally. Changes to the dual-regulatory system 
should therefore focus on harmonizing the interests of efficiency, 
objectivity, and simplicity, with the interest of protecting investors.  
III. EFFICIENCY, OBJECTIVITY, AND SIMPLICITY IN THE 
DUAL-REGULATORY SYSTEM 
Federal securities regulatory policy has long reflected that 
regulation should be limited to the extent needed to protect investors. 
Two perennial registration exemptions, now found in § 4 of the 
Securities Act of 1933, suggest that Congress never found it necessary to 
require registration for “private offers” of securities and most trades 
between investors.68 Subsection A will briefly discuss the statutory 
private offering exemption. This discussion will illustrate how the 
Supreme Court obfuscated the requirements for obtaining the exemption 
by establishing a subjective test for all purported private offerings. 
Subsection B will discuss the S.E.C.’s adoption of Regulation D 
under the Securities Act of 1933. Regulation D was one of several S.E.C. 
attempts to improve the efficiency of securities regulation by providing 
  
OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES THAT ARE NOT “COVERED SECURITIES” § 1(B)(3)(b) (1997), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/uniformy.htm. 
 
65
 See Horowitz, supra note 1 (discussing how the market for “blue sky” attorneys 
diminished after NSMIA). 
 
66
 See Campbell, supra note 4, at 181 (noting that an issuer’s high offering costs are 
caused, in part, by compliance with merit and qualification regulations, discounts on sale price due 
to resale restrictions, and out-of-pocket costs). 
 
67
 Lane, supra note 26, at 321; Macey and Miller, supra note 27, at 354 (noting that 
investors were widely investing in highly speculative schemes prior to the first blue sky laws); 
Sargent, supra note 27, at 792 (noting that state blue sky laws emerged to protect investors from 
fraudulent investments). 
 
68
 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(1)-(2). A private placement is the offer and sale of securities that 
does not involve a public offering. As the Supreme Court discussed in S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 
a private offering does not turn solely on the number of purchasers, but rather the amount and type 
of information available to the purchasers and the purchasers’ need for protection. 346 U.S. 119, 
125-26 (1953). 
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exemptions to registration for certain offers of securities.69 Specifically, 
Rule 506 of Regulation D created a more objective test for obtaining a 
private offering exemption than the Securities Act alone provided.70 The 
Commission also promulgated similar exemptions for other types of 
securities.71  
Finally, Subsection C will introduce NSMIA and the preemption 
standard for state securities law. As the legislative history indicates, 
NSMIA was intended to obviate state registration, pre-sale qualifications, 
and proxy regulations for certain securities typically traded in the 
national securities market.72 NSMIA exemplifies an effort to rebalance 
investor protections with the securities market’s need for greater 
efficiency and simplicity. 
A. The Statutory Private Offering Exemption: Section 4(2) of the 
Securities Act  
The Securities Act of 1933 has always provided a statutory 
private placement exemption and allowed issuers to avoid registering 
certain securities.73 Section 4(2) of the Securities Act provides that 
“transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering” are exempt 
from federal securities registration requirements.74  
However, the provision is ambiguous. NSMIA does not define 
the words “not involving any public offering.”75 Prior to the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., “public 
offering” seemed to many—indeed, it seemed to the Commission and 
Ralston Purina Co.—to refer to the number of persons or to the limits of 
a group offered the securities.76 The trial and appellate courts in the 
Ralston case also believed that an offer to a defined group, like a 
company’s employees, was not a “public offering.”77 
  
 
69
 Regulation D—Rules Governing the Limited Offer and Sale of Securities Without 
Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-06 (2008) (hereinafter 
Regulation D). 
 
70
 Id. § 230.506. 
 
71
 See, e.g., Regulation A—Conditional Small Issues Exemption, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-
63 (2008) (Providing an exemption for small offers of securities totaling not more than $5,000,000); 
Rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2008) (establishing more definite requirements for obtaining an 
exemption for intrastate offerings of securities under § 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act).  
 
72
 Steve A. Radom, Balkanization of Securities Regulation: The Case for Federal 
Preemption, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 295, at 307-08 (2003) (citing Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. 
Co., 251 F.3d 101, 108 (2d. Cir. 2001)). 
 
73
 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2). 
 
74
 Id. 
 
75
 Id. 
 
76
 S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 121-22, 125 (1953) (The Commission 
took issue with the fact that hundreds of employees were offered unregistered securities, regardless 
of their positions within the company or their competence with financial matters.). 
 
77
 S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 102 F. Supp. 964, 968-69 (D.C. Mo. 1952), aff’d, 200 
F.2d 85, 92 (8th Cir. 1953), rev’d, 346 U.S. at 125-26. 
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The Supreme Court in Ralston held that “public offering” refers 
to an offer to investors who did not know nor have access to information 
ordinarily disclosed during registration.78 The S.E.C. further obfuscated 
this subjective standard by adopting subjective rules consistent with the 
Ralston opinion.79 Former Rule 146 under the Securities Act required 
that the issuer in a private offering reasonably believe that each offeree 
had the knowledge, information, and business experience to evaluate the 
investment.80 Under the Ralston and Rule 146 standards, the number of 
offerees is not the sine qua non of a private offering.81 While the new 
private offering standard served to protect investors, the lack of an 
objective standard dissuaded issuers from seeking the private offering 
exemption.82 
B. The Regulatory Private Offering Exemption: Rule 506 of 
Regulation D 
By the 1980s, several commentators and the S.E.C. recognized 
that complying with federal securities regulations was considerably 
difficult and expensive.83 The extensive reporting requirements were 
especially burdensome for small businesses, which shouldered relatively 
higher costs than large businesses in acquiring investment capital 
through securities.84 Regulation D added efficient exemption rules, 
couched in objective terms. 
1. Regulation D 
Regulation D, adopted under the Securities Act in April 1982, 
originally provided six rules containing three new exemptions from 
federal registration.85 Rules 501 through 503 set forth general terms and 
  
 
78
 Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 126-27. 
 
79
 17 C.F.R § 230.146 (1975) (rescinded 1982); see also Transactions by an Issuer 
Deemed Not to Involve Any Public Offering (hereinafter Former Rule 146), 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261, 
15,266 (May 2, 1974), repealed by Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for 
Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales (hereinafter Exemption Revision), 47 Fed. Reg. 
11,251, 11,251 (Mar. 16, 1982); see also Note, Revising the Private Placement Exemption, 82 YALE 
L. J. 1512, 1519 (1973).  
 
80
 17 C.F.R § 230.146 (1975) (rescinded 1982); see also Former Rule 146, supra note 79, 
at 15,262. 
 
81
 See id.; Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 125-26. 
 
82
 See Manning Gilbert Warren III, A Review of Regulation D: The Present Exemption 
Regimen for Limited Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 357 n.13 
(1984) (citing Note, SEC Rules 144 and 146: Private Placements for the Few, 59 VA. L. REV. 886, 
921-22 (1973)) (noting that the Rule 146 requirements were so stringent that smaller issuers chose 
not to seek the exemption). 
 
83
 See id. at 355 n.1. 
 
84
 See id. at 356. 
 
85
 See Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-06 (2008); Exemption Revisions, supra note 
79, at 11,251. These rules were amended in 1989, and Rules 507 and 508 were added. See 
Regulation D; Accredited Investor and Filing Requirements (hereinafter 1989 Amendments), 54 
Fed. Reg. 11,369, 11,369-74 (Mar. 20, 1989) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.507-08 (2008)). 
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definitions governing the Regulation D exemptions.86 Rules 504 and 505 
provide the first two exemptions from federal registration for limited 
offers not exceeding a certain value.87 Rule 506, the third exemption, 
provides a regulatory private offering exemption in addition to, and in 
combination with, the statutory private offering exemption under 
§ 4(2).88  
Rule 501 defines special terms and describes calculation 
methods used for each exemption.89 For example, although an issuer 
loses the Rule 506 private offering exemption if the issuer sells securities 
to more than thirty-five investors,90 the thirty-five investors do not 
include one’s spouse or any “accredited investors”91 like banks, the 
issuer’s officers or directors, or very wealthy individuals.92  
Rule 502 limns several mandatory general conditions for issuers 
seeking to qualify for one of the exemptions.93 First, the issuer cannot 
publicly advertise the securities or solicit sales from the public.94 Second, 
the issuer must disclose substantial financial and non-financial 
information to any purchaser that was not an “accredited investor” as 
defined in Rule 501.95 Third, the issuer must reasonably ensure that no 
purchaser plans to resell the securities and must disclose this limitation 
on resale to each purchaser.96 Finally, Rule 502 warns that all securities 
offered or sold within six months of the proposed Regulation D offering 
may be considered part of that Regulation D offering, the “integration” 
requirement.97 “Integration” may disqualify the offering for an 
exemption, unless the issuer can give good reasons the separate offers 
should not be integrated.98 
  
 
86
 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-03. 
 
87
 Id. §§ 230.504-05.  
 
88
 Id. § 230.506. 
 
89
 Id. § 230.501. 
 
90
 Id. § 230.506(b). 
 
91
 “Accredited investor[s]” are investors presumed to have sufficient financial or 
business acumen, knowledge, or access to information to weigh the risks of investment. See id. § 
230.501(a).  
 
92
 Id. § 230.501(f). 
 
93
 Id. § 230.502.  
 
94
 Id. § 230.502(c). Such advertisements include such activities as newspaper 
publications or television advertisement Id. It also includes posting information regarding the offer 
of securities on the internet. See Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, Inc., 733 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2007). 
 
95
 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b). For a definition of “accredited investor,” see supra note 91. 
 
96
 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d).  
 
97
 Id. § 230.502(a). This rule prevents issuers from circumventing the dollar limits on 
exempt offers under Rules 504 and 505 by breaking up the single offer of securities into smaller 
offers. See Non-Public Offering Exemption, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316, 11,317 (Nov. 16, 1962). The 
integration requirement contained a “safe harbor” provision that guaranteed that separate offers or 
sales of securities would not be integrated if they took place more than six months apart. 17 C.F.R. § 
230.502(a). 
 
98
 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a). Whether two offers should be integrated into a single offer 
under Regulation D depends upon a variety of factors:  
(a) [w]hether the sales are part of a single plan of financing; 
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The last of the general conditions, Rule 503, requires the issuer 
to file a notice of sale (“Form D”) with the S.E.C within fifteen days of 
the first offer.99 Form D is a check-the-box-style form that allows the 
issuer to select the exemption or exemptions applicable to the particular 
securities offering.100 The form requires the issuer to identify all partners, 
officers, directors, promoters, non-accredited investors, and shareholders 
owning 10% or more of any class of the securities offered.101 The issuer 
must also state the offering price, the states in which the securities will 
be offered, and all non-accredited investors, if any.102 
2. The Rule 506 Regulatory Private Offering Exemption 
The Rule 506 exemption responded to frustrations and criticisms 
directed toward the S.E.C. following Ralston and Rule 146.103 It creates a 
regulatory private offering exemption for any issuer who sells securities 
to no more than thirty-five investors with sufficient financial acumen104 
and complies with the conditions set forth in Rules 501 and 502 (and 
originally, Rule 503).105 Many hedge funds—private investment 
companies that typically engage in highly leveraged or short-term trading 
strategies106—favor the Rule 506 exemption over other regulatory 
exemptions because it allows the issuer to sell unregistered securities of 
unlimited value to an unlimited number of accredited investors.107 
  
(b) [w]hether the sales involve issuance of the same class of securities; 
(c) [w]hether the sales have been made at or about the same time; 
(d) [w]hether the same type of consideration is being received; and 
(e) [w]hether the sales are made for the same general purpose. 
Id.; Non-Public Offering Exemption, supra note 97, at 11,317; see also S.E.C. v. Melchior, No. 90-
C-1024J, 1993 WL 89141, at *9 (D. Utah Jan. 14, 1993) (holding that an offer fails the Rule 506 
exemption due to its “integration” with previous offers). 
 
99
 17 C.F.R. § 230.503.  
 
100
 S.E.C., Form D, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2007). 
 
101
 Id. For a definition of “accredited investor,” see supra note 91. 
 
102
 Id. 
 
103
 See Exemption Revision, supra note 79, at 11,252; Warren, supra note 82, at 355-58. 
For a discussion of Ralston Purina and Rule 146, see supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text. 
 
104
 The thirty-five investors do not include accredited investors. See supra notes 91-92 
and accompanying text. Rule 506 requires the thirty-five investors to have sufficient financial 
experience to be able to evaluate the investment, or have a financial advisor who does. 17 C.F.R. § 
230.506(b)(2)(ii). 
 
105
 17 C.F.R. § 230.506; see 1989 Amendments, supra note 85, at 11,369 (filing the Rule 
503 notice is no longer required for any Regulation D exemption, but must still be filed under Rule 
507). For the requirements of Rules 501 through 503, see supra notes 89-102 and accompanying 
text. 
 
106
 Practising Law Institute, Hedge Funds, 1589 PLI/Corp 309, 313 (2007). 
 
107
 See id. at 315. Rule 506 does place a limit on the number of investors, but accredited 
investors are excluded from the calculation of the number of investors under Rule 501. 17 C.F.R. §§ 
230.501(e)(1)(iv), 506 (2008). 
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Rule 506 is considered a “safe harbor” provision for securities 
issued under § 4(2).108 A safe harbor is a prophylactic provision that 
permits one to avoid liability or statutory or regulatory penalties.109 Rule 
506 allows issuers to avoid losing a private offering exemption by 
providing an objective standard for determining whether an offer of 
securities qualifies for the exemption.110  
The adoption of Regulation D and Rule 506 exemplified the 
S.E.C.’s ideological shift away from qualitative and subjective rules.111 
However, even Rule 506, as originally drafted, did not completely satisfy 
the market’s need for efficiency and simplicity.112 Originally, Rule 506 
required unmitigated compliance with Rules 501 through 503 and the 
thirty-five purchaser limitation.113 These technical requirements were 
objective, but complex and demanding.114  
An issuer seeking a regulatory private offering exemption in 
1982 faced a host of technical compliance issues under Regulation D. 
For example, if the purchaser was an individual, not a bank or other 
institutional investor, the issuer had to inquire as to the individual’s net 
worth or annual income.115 If some investors were not accredited, the 
issuer had to give such investors audited financial statements, plus much 
of the non-financial information that would have been disclosed through 
registration.116 Additionally, the issuer had to gauge the financial acumen 
of all non-accredited purchasers, or their financial advisors, to ensure that 
the investor could sufficiently understand the risks of investment.117  
Failure to satisfy any of the Rule 506 requirements, before the 
1989 amendments to Regulation D, was ostensibly fatal to the regulatory 
exemption.118 Having satisfied most of the pre-amendment exemption 
conditions, the issuer could still have lost the exemption fifteen days 
after the first offer by failing to file the Form D notice of sale.119 The 
  
 
108
 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2); see also Warren, supra note 82, at 357. 
 
109
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1363 (8th ed. 2004). 
 
110
 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. The standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Ralston Purina 
made it more complex and difficult for issuers to determine whether any particular offer would be 
considered non-public. See Exemption Revisions, supra note 79, at 11,252; S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina, 
346 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1953). 
 
111
 See Exemption Revision, supra note 79, at 11,251. 
 
112
 See Warren, supra note 82, at 383. 
 
113
 Regulation D, supra note 69, at 11,266 (current version codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.506). 
 
114
 Mark A. Sargent, The New Regulation D: Deregulation, Federalism and the Dynamics 
of Regulatory Reform, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 225, 240-41 (1990) (noting that initial exuberance 
regarding Regulation D waned as investors struggled with the disclosure rules, integration, and the 
notice-filing requirements). 
 
115
 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(6)-(7). 
 
116
 Id. § 230.502(b). 
 
117
 Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii); see also supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text. 
 
118
 Cf. Warren, supra note 82, at 383 (Although the exemption would be lost, the S.E.C. 
had discretion to make exceptions in any particular case.).  
 
119
 Regulation D, supra note 69, at 11,265-66 (current version codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 
230.503, 506(b)) (Rule 506 originally required compliance with Rule 503 as a condition of the 
private offering exemption.); see also Warren, supra note 82, at 383.  
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issuer could also have lost the exemption by selling a non-exempt 
security at any time during the following six months (due to the 
“integration” provision of Rule 502).120 Although the S.E.C. had 
discretion to exempt issuers that failed to satisfy a technical requirement 
of Rule 506, investors could seek rescission of their purchase in court, 
claiming the issuer illegally sold them unregistered, non-exempt 
securities.121 An issuer, cast out from under the protective aegis of Rule 
506, was forced to prove a § 4(2) statutory exemption under the 
subjective test in Ralston.122  
In 1989, the S.E.C. addressed these problems of complexity by 
amending Regulation D.123 The amendment first omitted the Rule 503 
notice filing requirement from every Regulation D exemption, such that 
no Regulation D exemption will fail due to a failure to file Form D.124 
However, the Commission maintained the notice filing requirement by 
adding Rule 507, which automatically disqualifies one who violates Rule 
503 from claiming any future Regulation D exemption, subject to the 
discretion of the S.E.C.125 Thus, the amendment simplifies Regulation D 
exemption requirements without significantly diminishing investor 
protections. 
The Commission further adopted Rule 508, an additional safe 
harbor for issuers seeking a Regulation D exemption.126 Rule 508 allows 
issuers to commit insignificant violations of Regulation D conditions 
without abdicating any exemptions, so long as the issuers attempt to 
comply in good faith and no one was harmed by the violation.127 Rule 
508 maintains, however, that general solicitation128 or exceeding the 
permissible number of purchasers under Rule 502 cannot be deemed 
insignificant.129 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals examined the effect 
  
 
120
 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a). For a discussion of integration, see supra notes 97-98 and 
accompanying text. 
 
121
 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2006) (making it unlawful to offer or sell unregistered (and non-
exempt) securities); id. § 77l(a) (2006) (providing civil liabilities for violating the registration 
requirements of § 5); Warren, supra note 82, at 383. 
 
122
 See Preliminary Notes, Regulation D, supra note 56 (“Attempted compliance with any 
rule in Regulation D does not act as an exclusive election; the issuer can also claim the availability 
of any other applicable exemption. For instance, an issuer’s failure to satisfy all the terms and 
conditions of Rule 506 shall not raise any presumption that the exemption provided by section 4(2) 
of the Act is not available.”); S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1953). 
 
123
 1989 Amendments, supra note 85, at 11,369; see Sargent, supra note 114, at 241-42. 
 
124
 1989 Amendments, supra note 85, at 11,369; see supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 
125
 17 C.F.R. § 230.507. 
 
126
 Id. § 230.508. 
 
127
 See id. 
 
128
 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 
129
 17 C.F.R. § 230.508(a)(2); see id. § 230.502(c) (regarding limitations on general 
solicitation); Pinnacle, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1084 (holding that a failure to provide an audited balance 
sheet to investors that were not “accredited investors” may defeat a Regulation D exemption); 
Risdall, 733 N.W.2d at 829 (stating that any general solicitation will defeat a Regulation D private 
placement exemption, without regard to whether the general solicitation was intentional or 
inadvertent).  
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of Rule 508 in 1992, finding that a sale to non-accredited investors 
without providing audited financial statements130 was harmless error 
under Rule 508 because the investor represented himself as an accredited 
investor.131  
3. Lessons from “D-regulation” 
Although Regulation D did not remedy all problems with the 
dual regulatory system, it demonstrates certain goals of regulating 
securities markets in the United States. These include balancing the 
investor’s need for protection against fraud and risky investments with 
the market’s need for efficient, cost minimizing procedures; objective, 
clearly defined rules; and simple, easy to follow provisions.  
The dual regulatory structure of securities markets protected 
investors at the cost of diminished efficiency in capital formation.132 
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act exempted private offerings of 
securities from registration to reduce the costs and burdens of registration 
at a minimal risk to investors.133 While this exemption promoted 
efficiency in securities markets, the Ralston decision illustrates how 
liberal use of the exemption could threaten investor protections.134 The 
regulatory solution, provided by former Rule 146, rendered the 
conditions for the private offering exemption so subjective as to diminish 
the utility of the exemption and the efficiency of securities markets.135 
Rule 506 of Regulation D introduced objective conditions, providing 
issuers a safe harbor to engage in private offerings without fear of losing 
their exemption.136 However, the Rule 506 requirements were so complex 
and unforgiving that it was easy to lose or fail to qualify for the 
exemption.137 Finally, the 1989 amendments introduced an additional 
safe harbor to Regulation D, simplifying the conditions for each of its 
exemptions and ensuring that no exemption would fail due to harmless 
error.138  
C. The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 
Efficiency, objectivity, and simplicity in securities regulation 
only become more important as markets expand both domestically and 
  
 
130
 See supra notes 95 and 116 and accompanying text. 
 
131
 Wright v. Nat’l Warranty Co., 953 F.2d 256, 260-61 (6th Cir. 1992). 
 
132
 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 
133
 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2); see discussion supra Part III.A. 
 
134
 S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. 119, 125-26; see discussion supra note 76 and 
accompanying text. 
 
135
 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1975) (rescinded 1982); see also Former Rule 146, supra note 
79, at 15,262; see discussion supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. 
 
136
 See supra notes 103-107 and accompanying text. 
 
137
 See supra notes 111-122 and accompanying text. 
 
138
 See supra notes 123-131 and accompanying text. 
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internationally. Between 1979 and 1999 alone, the percentage of U.S. 
households investing in mutual funds increased from 6% to 49%, which 
may be attributed to the growth and development of retirement funds.139 
In 2005, individual, non-institutional investors poured an estimated $400 
billion or more into hedge funds.140 At the end of 2007, registered 
investment companies in the United States controlled over $12 trillion of 
investor capital, excluding hedge funds.141 International capital markets 
are also expected to expand dramatically in the near future.142 One need 
look no further than the recent merger between the NYSE and Euronext 
securities exchanges,143 the merger of In Bev and Anheuser Busch,144 or 
Abu Dhabi’s purchase of the Chrysler building145 to witness a more 
liberal global capital market.  
Commentators over the past few decades offered different views 
regarding the viability of the dual regulatory system, given the growth of 
securities markets. Some argued that duplicative regulation hampered 
capital formation by requiring costly compliance with multifarious 
registration and disclosure requirements.146 Others argued that merit and 
quality standards, found in many blue sky laws and the Uniform 
Securities Act,147 were costly and unnecessary to protect investors.148 
Still, others defended blue sky laws, arguing that such laws offered 
investors protection against fraud and excessive risk and illustrating how 
  
 
139
 S.E.C. DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, REPORT ON MUTUAL FUND FEES 
AND EXPENSES (2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/feestudy.htm (last visited Oct. 
19, 2008). 
 
140
 Hennesee Group, LLC, Information on Number of Hedge Funds & Assets (Jan-50 to 
Jan-07) (2007), available at http://www.hennesseegroup.com/information/index.html (last visited 
July 25, 2008); Hennesee Group, LLC, Sources of Hedge Fund Capital (2007), available at 
http://www.hennesseegroup.com/information/index.html (last visited July 25, 2008). This figure is 
estimated based on data gathered from hedge fund surveys because hedge funds are not required to 
register with or submit reports to the S.E.C. See Hennesee Group, LLC, What is a Hedge Fund? 
http://www.hennesseegroup.com/hedgefund/index.html (last visited July 25, 2008).  
 
141
 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2008 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A 
REVIEW OF TRENDS AND ACTIVITY IN THE INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 20 (48th ed. 2008), 
available at http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2008_factbook.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2009). 
 
142
 See Brian J. Fahrney, State Blue Sky Laws: A Stronger Case for Federal Pre-Emption 
Due to Increasing Internationalization of Securities Markets, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 753, 775-76 (1992). 
 
143
 See generally NYSE Euronext Corporate Press Kit, available at http://www.nyse.com/ 
about/ newsevents/1173781658059.html (NYSE commenced trading on April 4, 2007); Jenny 
Anderson & Heather Timmons, NYSE Group Reaches Deal to Acquire Euronext, N.Y. TIMES, June 
2, 2006, at C3 (noting that the merger between the large, New York-based exchanged and the pan-
European exchange would create the first trans-Atlantic marketplace for securities). 
 
144
 See generally Anheuser-Busch InBev, InBev and Anheuser Busch Agree to Combine, 
Creating the Global Leader in Beer with Budweiser as its Flagship Brand (July 13, 2008), 
http://www.anheuserbusch.com/ Press/PressImages/FINAL%20PRESS%20RELEASE.pdf.  
 
145
 See generally Charles V. Bagli, Abu Dhabi Buys 90% Stake in Chrysler Building, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 10, 2008, at B3. 
 
146
 See, e.g., Fahrney, supra note 142, at 776; Karmel, supra note 3, at 106-08. 
 
147
 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 
148
 See, e.g., Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky 
Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 553, 566 (1985) (arguing that merit regulation of securities is antithetical 
to a market economy); Fahrney, supra note 142, at 765-66 (noting that merit review adds to the 
state’s administrative fees and the issuer’s legal and accounting fees). 
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such laws allowed inexperienced investors to perform as well as 
experienced investors.149 Another commentator urged that blue sky laws 
provide necessary disclosures to investors that federal disclosures would 
not reveal.150 Federal policy would reflect the arguments in favor of a 
singular regulatory system.  
In 1996, Congress passed NSMIA, which limited the 
applicability of blue sky laws to improve the efficiency of national 
securities markets.151 The introduction to NSMIA heralds the intent of 
the statue, “[t]o amend the Federal securities laws in order to promote 
efficiency and capital formation in the financial markets, and to . . . 
promote more efficient management of mutual funds, protect investors, 
and provide more effective and less burdensome regulation.”152 The 
House Commerce Committee report, accompanying House Resolution 
2003 (NSMIA), reiterated this contention,153 and further recognized the 
need to modify the dual-regulatory system: 
Testimony demonstrated a clear need for modernization and indicated 
that, notwithstanding past reform efforts, there continues to be a 
substantial degree of duplication between Federal and State securities 
regulation, and that this duplication tends to raise the cost of capital to 
American issuers of securities without providing commensurate 
protection to investors or our markets.154 
Accordingly, NSMIA federalized registration and disclosure 
requirements for certain offerings involving “covered securities,” as 
defined in the act.155 States are not only prohibited from requiring 
registration or disclosures for these “covered securities,” but also from 
prohibiting or regulating the sale of such securities based on their merit 
or quality.156  
The term “covered securities,” as defined under NSMIA, 
encompasses a broad array of securities.157 “Covered securities” includes 
securities traded on national exchanges like the NYSE, the AMEX, and 
  
 
149
 See, e.g., Lane, supra note 26, at 338, 347-48 (arguing that local authorities can best 
enforce securities regulation and that state authority should be balanced with federal authority, not 
abrogated); Walker & Hadaway, supra note 23, at 681 (finding that inexperienced investors in merit-
regulating states have performed as well as experienced investors elsewhere). 
 
150
 See Sargent, supra note 52, at 1056-59. 
 
151
 See NSMIA, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416, 3416 (1996). 
 
152
 Id. 
 
153
 H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 1 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3877. 
 
154
 Id. at 2, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3878. “Covered securities” encompass 
(1) securities traded on national exchanges, (2) securities sold by investment companies registered 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940, (3) securities sold to “qualified purchasers,” as yet 
undefined, and (4) certain securities sold in exempt offerings. See Kevin A. Jones, The National 
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996: A New Model for Efficient Capital Formation, 53 
ARK. L. REV. 153, 156-64 (2000). 
 
155
 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r(a)(1)-(2), (b)(4) (2006). 
 
156
 See id. §§ 77r(a)(1)-(3). 
 
157
 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 3877. 
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the NASDAQ Stock Market.158 All securities issued by registered 
investment companies (e.g., most mutual fund shares) are “covered 
securities” as well.159 A third category of “covered securities” 
encompasses securities sold to “qualified purchasers,” a term that the 
S.E.C. has not yet defined and gives the S.E.C. considerable authority to 
expand the scope of NSMIA.160 Finally, “covered securities” includes 
securities sold in certain offerings exempt from federal registration.161  
The problems of interpretation raised in this Note concern 
primarily the fourth and final category of “covered securities,” which 
includes securities qualifying for the regulatory private offering 
exemption under Regulation D Rule 506.162 As indicated earlier, § 4(2) of 
the Securities Act provides a statutory private placement exemption 
covering any transaction that does not involve a “public offering,” but 
the statutory exemption employs a highly subjective test.163 Rule 506 
provides a set of objective conditions that would allow an issuer to 
qualify for a regulatory private offering exemption.164 NSMIA extends 
the policy of exemption to state regulators because investors in a Rule 
506 private offering are, by definition, accredited165 or otherwise capable 
of making informed investment decisions without the protection of 
government.166 In addition to securities qualifying for the Rule 506 
exemption, “covered securities” include securities satisfying certain 
exemptions: (1) the exemption for transactions by one who is not an 
issuer, underwriter, or dealer,167 (2) the exemptions for certain 
  
 
158
 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A); see also Jones, supra note 154, at 156. 
 
159
 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(2); see also Jones, supra note 154, at 157. 
 
160
 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3); see also Jones, supra note 154, at 158-59. Although the 
Commission has not adopted a formal definition of “qualified purchaser” to date, the Commission 
has proposed that an appropriate definition would be similar, if not identical, to that of a Rule 501 
“accredited investor.” See Defining the Term “Qualified Purchaser” Under the Securities Act of 
1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230 (proposed Dec. 19, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-
8041.htm [hereinafter Qualified Purchaser]. 
 
161
 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4); see also Jones, supra note 154, at 162 (summarizing these 
securities as “certain government and bank securities, securities issued by certain pension, profit-
sharing and similar plans, notes having a maturity of less than nine months, interests in railroad 
equipment trusts, certain certificates issued in a case under Title 11, and certain insurance, 
endowment, or annuity contracts”). 
 
162
 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (“covered security” includes any security exempt from 
federal registration under any S.E.C. rule issued under the Securities Act § 4(2), the private offering 
exemption). 
 
163
 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2); see supra also notes 73-82 and accompanying text. 
 
164
 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506; see also supra notes 103-110 and accompanying text. 
 
165
 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. 
 
166
 See Jones, supra note 154, at 163. 
 
167
 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1); id. § 77r(b)(4)(A). An issuer is one who issues securities. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 850 (8th ed. 2004). An underwriter is usually an investment banker that 
purchases securities from the issuer and resells the securities to the public. Id. at 1562. A dealer is 
one who buys securities and sells them at retail. Id. at 427. For the statutory definitions of the terms 
“issuer,” underwriter,” or “dealer,” see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(4), (11)-(12) (2006). This exemption 
applies to trades by investors selling securities already issued, trades in the secondary securities 
market, which are regulated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 79A C.J.S. Securities 
Regulation § 63 (2007); see also Jones, supra note 154, at 159-60. 
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transactions by dealers and brokers,168 and (3) the various exemptions 
allowed under § 3(a) for securities like federal bonds, insurance policies, 
and commercial paper.169  
However, Congress has not abrogated all of the states’ regulatory 
functions. NSMIA does not preclude states from prosecuting securities 
fraud, thereby preserving the principal function and purpose of blue sky 
laws.170 The act also permits states to require notice of offers and sales, 
payment of fees, and the disclosure of certain other information for the 
purposes of collecting fees and consenting to service of process.171 
Finally, “covered securities” does not include all securities,172 and it 
specifically excludes certain types of securities.173  
IV. THE PRIVATE PLACEMENT PREEMPTION STANDARD UNDER 
NSMIA 
Like Regulation D in 1982, NSMIA was not adopted without its 
flaws. Indeed, the definition of “covered securities” was amended in 
1998 to prevent NSMIA from preventing state courts from ruling on the 
fairness of mergers and reorganizations, in which shares are commonly 
exchanged for other shares without registration.174 Additionally, courts in 
several state and federal jurisdictions have been unable to agree on a 
preemption standard under NSMIA for securities qualifying for the Rule 
506 private offering exemption.175 It is not clear whether Congress 
  
 
168
 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(3)-(4); id. §§ 77r(b)(4)(A)-(B). The “dealer” exemption applies 
to all transactions made by a securities dealer—one who buys and sells securities, usually on the 
secondary market—except when that dealer is trading as an “underwriter”—one who buys 
unregistered securities from the issuer with the intent to resell to the public. BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 427, 1562 (8th ed. 2004); see also Jones, supra note 154, at 159-60 & nn.42-43. 
  The “broker” exemption applies to all transactions by a securities broker—one who 
buys and sells securities on behalf of someone else—when that broker is merely selling securities 
based on a customer’s order. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 206 (8th ed. 2004); see also Jones, supra 
note 154, at 160-61 & n.47. 
 
169
 See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (2006). Not all exemptions found under Securities Act of 1933 
§ 3(a) are “covered securities” under NSMIA. For example, NSMIA excludes those securities 
qualifying for the intrastate offering exemption, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11), and the exemption for 
charitable and not-for-profit issuers, id. § 77c(a)(4). Id. § 77r(b)(4)(C); see also Jones, supra note 
154, at 162.  
  “Covered securities” was later amended to exclude securities exchanged pursuant to a 
government-approved fairness hearing. See Div. Corp. Fin., S.E.C., Revised Staff Legal Bulletin No. 
3: Section 3(a)(10) Exemption (Oct. 20, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb3r.htm. 
Such securities are exempt from federal registration under Securities Act § 3(a) if a court has already 
determined that the transaction is fair to investors. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(10). This corrected the 
unintended effect of NSMIA preempting a state court from ruling on the fairness of an exchange of 
securities during a merger or other corporate reorganization. See Revised Staff Legal Bulletin No. 3, 
supra. 
 
170
 See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1); see also Jones, supra note 154, at 164. 
 
171
 See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(2)(A); see also Jones, supra note 154, at 164-65. 
 
172
 See supra notes 157-162 and accompanying text. 
 
173
 For securities specifically excluded from “covered securities,” see supra note 169. 
 
174
 See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 
175
 Compare Buist v. Time Domain Corp., 926 So. 2d 290, 298 (Ala. 2005) (holding that 
proof of a Regulation D exemption is required before the issuer is exempt from state regulation 
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intended the preemption provision of NSMIA to be applied narrowly—
only if the issuer can prove that the security qualifies for the private 
offering exemption—or broadly—preempting blue sky law for all 
securities offered pursuant to the private offering exemption. As Chief 
Judge Babcock of the Colorado District Court phrased the issue, must an 
issuer “prove preemption by proving exemption?”176  
Subsection A will discuss the problem of determining Congress’ 
intent with respect to the breadth of blue sky law preemption under 
NSMIA. Subsection B will examine the narrow preemption standard for 
private offerings: NSMIA preempts state regulation private offerings 
only if the issuer can first prove that the Rule 506 private offering 
exemption applies.177 Subsection C will evaluate the broad preemption 
standard for private offerings under NSMIA: NSMIA broadly preempts 
blue sky laws for any securities offered pursuant to Rule 506. Proponents 
of this standard asseverate that Congress intended for national securities 
offerings to be regulated exclusively by federal law, including securities sold 
pursuant to a federal exemption, even if the federal exemption is invalid.178  
A. Preemption of State Law and the Private Offering Exemption  
Although NSMIA preempts blue sky laws regulating several 
types of securities and transactions, securities sold in private offerings 
present a special case for the application of NSMIA’s preemption rules. 
The primary purpose of NSMIA is to improve the efficiency of capital 
formation in national securities markets, without undermining the 
protection of investors.179 The legislative history further suggests that 
NSMIA would improve efficiency and reduce the cost of capital 
formation by federalizing securities regulation.180 Accordingly, NSMIA 
prohibits states from requiring registration, disclosure, or merit review 
for certain “covered securities” like those traded in private offerings.181 
This history suggests that Congress intended for the federal government 
to regulate Rule 506 private offerings exclusively. However, it is not 
clear whether exclusive regulation of private offerings includes the 
  
under NSMIA), with Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, Inc., 733 N.W.2d 827, 832 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) 
(holding that NSMIA preempts blue sky law regulating any securities offered in reliance upon the 
regulatory private offering exemption of Rule 506). 
 
176
 See Grubka v. WebAccess Int’l Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1269 (D. Colo. 2006) (holding 
that the issuer must prove the exemption in order to prove that state law was preempted under NSMIA). 
 
177
 E.g., Brown v. Earthbound Sports USA, Inc., 481 F.3d 901, 910 (6th Cir. 2007) (“We 
now agree with those courts that have held that offerings must actually qualify for a valid federal 
securities registration exemption in order to enjoy NSMIA preemption.”). 
 
178
 E.g., Risdall, 733 N.W.2d at 832 (“‘[W]hen an offering purports to be exempt under 
federal Regulation D, any allegation of improper registration is covered exclusively by federal law.’” 
(quoting Pinnacle Commc’ns Int’l Inc. v. Am. Family Mortgage Corp., 417 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1087 
(D. Minn. 2006))). 
 
179
 See NSMIA, supra note 151, at 3416; see also supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text. 
 
180
 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3878. 
 
181
 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r(a)(1)-(3) (2006). 
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exclusive imposition of federal remedies when such purportedly private 
offerings fail to satisfy Rule 506.  
The narrow preemption standard stems from a strict, textualist 
interpretation of the Act. Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933, as 
amended by NSMIA, provides unambiguously that only “exempt” 
securities are “covered securities” under NSMIA: 
(a) Scope of exemption. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no law, 
rule, regulation, or order, or other administrative action of any State or any 
political subdivision thereof— 
(1) requiring, or with respect to, registration or qualification of securities, 
or registration or qualification of securities transactions, shall directly or 
indirectly apply to a security that— 
(A) is a covered security; or 
(B) will be a covered security upon completion of the 
transaction;  
. . . . 
(b) Covered securities. For purposes of this section, the following are covered 
securities: 
. . . . 
(4) Exemption in connection with certain exempt offerings.—A security is 
a covered security with respect to a transaction that is exempt from 
registration under this subchapter pursuant to— 
. . . . 
(D) Commission rules or regulations issued under section 77d(2) 
of this title, except that this subparagraph does not prohibit a 
State from imposing notice filing requirements that are 
substantially similar to those required by rule or regulation 
under section 77d(2) of this title that are in effect on September 
1, 1996.182 
Subsection (b)(4)(D) refers to “rules or regulations issued under 
section [4](2).”183 Rule 506 of Regulation D provides, in relevant part: 
(a) Exemption. Offers and sales of securities by an issuer that satisfy the 
conditions in paragraph (b) of this section shall be deemed to be transactions 
not involving any public offering within the meaning of section 4(2) of the 
Act.184 
When NSMIA is read in light of Rule 506, the use of the word 
“exempt” in subsection (b)(4)(D) suggests that NSMIA will only 
  
 
182
 Id. §§ 77r(a)-(b) (emphasis in subsection 18(b)(4) added). 
 
183
 Id. § 77r(b)(4)(D). 
 
184
 17 C.F. R. § 230.506.  
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preempt blue sky law from regulating private offerings if such offerings 
actually satisfy the terms of Rule 506.185 
NSMIA’s preemption standard is more difficult to apply with a 
Rule 506 private offering than with any other covered security under 
NSMIA because it is relatively easy to identify other types of covered 
securities.186 For example, NSMIA exempts from state regulation all 
securities sold on national exchanges, federal bonds, and mutual fund 
shares,187 but these covered securities are readily identifiable, without 
complicated inquiry or extensive investigation.  
Additionally, the issue of whether one must “prove preemption 
by proving exemption”188 does not arise with most transactions exempt 
from state regulations under NSMIA. The § 4(1) exemption for 
transactions by those who are not issuers, underwriters, or dealers 
ordinarily covers average investor transactions in the secondary market 
without causing undue confusion.189 The §§ 4(3) and 4(4) exemptions for 
dealer and broker transactions are simple to apply in most cases because 
almost all dealer transactions are exempt and broker transactions are 
exempt if the broker is merely placing a client’s order on an exchange or 
over-the-counter market.190 One difficulty that may arise in keeping these 
§ 4 exemptions is avoiding status as an “underwriter,” one who acquires 
a security from an issuer with the intent to distribute it to the public.191 
However, even if a case were to arise, challenging NSMIA preemption 
based on the failure of one of these § 4 exemptions, Rule 144 of the 
Securities Act provides a safe harbor against underwriter status with an 
objective set of conditions.192  
  
 
185
 For a discussion of the terms of Rule 506, see supra Part III.B.2.  
 
186
 But see supra note 160 and accompanying text (defining the class of “covered 
securities” as those securities sold to “qualified purchasers”). Depending on how the Commission 
eventually defines this term, an issue similar to the one analyzed in this Note may arise. 
 
187
 See 15 U.S.C. § §77r(b)(1), (b)(4)(C). 
 
188
 Grubka v. WebAccess Int’l Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1269 (D. Colo. 2006). 
 
189
 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1); see Preliminary Note, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2007) (“Section 4(1) 
was intended to exempt only routine trading transactions between individual investors with respect 
to securities already issued and not to exempt distributions by issuers or acts of other individuals 
who engage in steps necessary to such distributions.”); see supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 
190
 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(1)-(3); see also Jones, supra note 154, at 159-60; see supra note 
168 and accompanying text. 
 
191
 See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11); Preliminary Note, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144; see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77d(1) (stating that a seller who qualifies as an underwriter is not exempt from the registration 
requirements of the Securities Act). 
 
192
 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(1)-(3); see Jones, supra note 154, at 159-60. Under Rule 144, 
dealers and investors holding unregistered securities can avoid underwriter status by ensuring that 
there is adequate public information on the security they are selling, holding the security for at least 
a year before selling, limiting the number of shares sold, and selling the securities in broker 
transactions, all within the terms of Rule 144. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(c)-(f). Brokers can avoid being 
considered underwriters by trading only upon client orders, refusing to solicit sales of the securities, 
collecting fees at a standard rate for each transaction, and asking clients a few questions about the 
nature of the securities. See id. § 230.144(g). 
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In contrast, determining whether a security is exempt from 
registration under Rule 506 requires a much more complicated inquiry.193 
As previously discussed, the issuer must inquire as to each of purchaser’s 
knowledge and finances, to provide such financial and non-financial 
information to certain purchasers that the issuer would have prepared for 
certain registration statements, and to avoid making any public statement 
that may be considered an impermissible general solicitation.194  
Moreover, a Rule 506 private offering exemption can be 
transitory, in that certain conditions after the completion of the offering 
may abrogate the exemption retroactively.195 Regulation D “integrates” 
certain offers made within six months of each other and treats them as a 
single offer,196 such that a later, non-exempt offer may void an earlier 
offer’s exemption.197 An issuer who fails to qualify for a Rule 506 
exemption might not discover the failure of the exemption until much 
later because the veracity of private offering exemptions is often tested 
for the first time in court.198  
The greater degree of uncertainty appurtenant to every private 
offering under Rule 506 begs the question whether the conditions for 
preemption should be as elusive and convoluted as the conditions for 
exemption. To answer this question affirmatively is to advance the public 
policy of protecting investors. To resolve this issue by relaxing the 
conditions for preemption is to effect a more unitary and efficient 
securities market. Any resolution, however, must be driven by S.E.C. 
regulation. Courts have not resolved this issue uniformly,199 which only 
further undermines the efficiencies NSMIA was intended to introduce.200 
B. Narrow Construction of NSMIA’s Preemption Provision 
Some courts have held that an issuer claiming a regulatory 
private placement exemption under Rule 506 is not exempt from state 
law unless the issuer proves the validity of the private offering 
  
 
193
 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506; see also discussion supra Part III.B.2.  
 
194
 See supra Part III.B.2. 
 
195
 See, e.g., Buist v. Time Domain Corp., 926 So. 2d 290, 297-98 (Ala. 2005) (“Even if 
the filing of a Form D is sufficient to obtain the exemption necessary for a finding of federal 
preemption, proof that an exemption was obtained is no evidence that the exemption exists at any 
later date . . . .”). 
 
196
 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (The integration requirement under 
Regulation D applies to each of the Regulation D exemptions.). 
 
197
 See S.E.C. v. Melchior, No. 90-C-1024J, 1993 WL 89141, at *9 (D. Utah Jan. 14, 1993). 
 
198
 Pinnacle Commc’ns Int’l Inc. v. Am. Family Mortgage Corp., 417 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 
1086-87 (D. Minn. 2006) (Rule 506 exemption threatened more than two years after the initial 
offering because the issuer named two non-accredited investors on its Form D filing, allegedly due 
to a clerical error that was later corrected). 
 
199
 Compare Hamby v. Clearwater Consulting Concepts, LLLP, 428 F. Supp. 2d 915, 921 
(E.D. Ark 2006), with Temple v. Gorman, 201 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1243-44 (S.D. Fla. 2002). 
 
200
 H.R. REP. NO. 104-622, at 16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3878 (1996). 
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exemption.201 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
was the first federal court to decide this issue in 2002, adopting a more 
liberal interpretation of the NSMIA preemption rules.202 In Temple v. 
Gorman, the Florida court reasoned that Congress intended to make the 
federal government the exclusive regulator for national securities offerings.203  
However, since that time, the weight of authority has been tipped 
overwhelmingly toward a narrow construction of the NSMIA preemption 
provision, based on a textualist reading of the statute.204 The first court to 
disagree with the Temple standard was the Alabama Supreme Court in 
Buist v. Time Domain Corp.205 In that case, after an allegedly unfair 
reorganization, a minority shareholder sought rescission based on the 
corporate issuer’s failure to register the securities in Alabama.206 
Although the company had completed the offering and indicated that the 
offering was subject to the Rule 506 exemption on its Form D,207 the 
Court held that the company needed to prove that the securities were exempt 
under Rule 506 when issued and continued to qualify for the exemption:  
[F]ailure to comply with a requirement of Rule 506 “voids” the exemption, 
thereby eliminating the possibility of preemption . . . . [T]he exempt status of 
the sale of securities that deviates from any of the material commitments made 
in its Form D filing is repealed retroactively.208  
The Buist court dismissed the preemption standard adopted by the 
Florida District Court as unsubstantiated, without any authority.209 
Other courts were quick to follow at both the state and federal 
levels. The Colorado Federal District Court later held in Grubka v. 
WebAccess that the statute unambiguously requires proof of the Rule 506 
exemption before a finding of state law preemption.210 The federal court 
in Grubka notably followed the Alabama state court’s decision in 
Buist,211 and not the Florida Federal District Court’s in Temple.212 An 
Ohio appellate court adopted the Buist court’s preemption standard,213 as 
  
 
201
 See Brown v. Earthbound Sports USA, Inc., 481 F.3d 906, 911-12 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 
202
 Temple, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 1243-44. 
 
203
 Id. at 1244. 
 
204
 See Brown, 481 F.3d at 909-10; Grubka v. WebAccess Int’l Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 
1259, 1270 (D. Colo. 2006); Hamby, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 921; In re Blue Flame Energy Corp., 871 
N.E.2d 1227, 1244 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006); Buist v. Time Domain Corp., 926 So. 2d 290, 298 (Ala. 2005). 
 
205
 926 So. 2d at 297. 
 
206
 See id. at 292-93. 
 
207
 Id. at 292. For a discussion of Form D, see supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text.  
 
208
 Buist, 926 So .2d at 298. 
 
209
 See id. at 297. 
 
210
 Grubka v. WebAccess Int’l, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1270 (D. Colo. 2006) (finding 
that NSMIA unambiguously requires an exemption before the statute will preempt state law and that 
it is unnecessary to turn to legislative history for the intent of Congress). 
 
211
 Buist, 926 So. 2d at 298. 
 
212
 Temple v. Gorman, 201 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1244 (S.D. Fla. 2002). 
 
213
 In re Blue Flame Energy Corp., 871 N.E.2d 1227, 1244 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). 
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did a California appellate court in a recent case.214 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the highest court to review the relevant authority 
on this issue, also held that preemption was predicated on proof of a valid 
exemption.215 In rejecting the holding in Temple, the court reasoned that: 
[Those suggesting a broad preemption standard] urge us to avert our eyes from 
the statute’s plain language and look instead to legislative intent as supposedly 
espoused by the gloss on which they . . . rely. But resorting to legislative 
history is always a risky endeavor, subject to manipulation by individual 
legislators and by simple mistakes of fact by the courts.216 
The narrow preemption standard is easily supported by the 
statute and prevents possible abuse of NSMIA. Requiring some proof 
that the security is exempt, and therefore a covered security, prevents 
issuers from circumventing state law investor protections by claiming a 
Rule 506 exemption in offering documents, or even claiming the 
exemption ex post.217 “Such an intent seems unlikely, in any event; that a 
defendant could avoid liability under state law simply by declaiming its 
alleged compliance with Regulation D is an unsavory proposition and 
would eviscerate the statute.”218 
However, there are practical problems with the narrow 
preemption standard. NSMIA preempts state registration and merit 
regulation of exempt private offerings,219 and the Rule 506 private 
offering exemption may be lost retroactively.220 Under the narrow 
preemption standard, issuers would only have to prove a private offering 
exemption to the states after the offering, when an investor raises the 
issue of NSMIA preemption.221 This means that states do not actually 
regulate securities offered pursuant to Rule 506. Instead, the validity of 
the Rule 506 exemption only determines whether each individual state is 
allowed to impose remedies for failing to register the non-exempt 
security. This provides little, if any, additional protection to investors.  
Second, the uncertainty of preemption eviscerates the economies 
that normally inhere in preemption because it gives issuers an incentive 
to register private offerings with the states, instead of relying on 
  
 
214
 Apollo Capital Fund, LLC v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 199, 220 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (accepting the 6th Circuit’s decision in Brown as the strongest authority on this 
issue, given the line of cases criticizing the holding in Temple). 
 
215
 See Brown v. Earthbound Sports USA, Inc., 481 F.3d 901, 912 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 
216
 Id. 
 
217
 See COHN, supra note 18, § 6:24.50. 
 
218
 Grubka v. WebAccess Int’l, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1270 (D. Colo. 2006). 
 
219
 See supra Part III.C. 
 
220
 Warren, supra note 82, at 383; see supra notes 195-198 and accompanying text. 
 
221
 An issuer is required to file a Form D notice of sale with the S.E.C. and the state when 
conducting a private offering. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.503, .507 (2008). Form D does not require proof that 
the Rule 506 exemption is valid. See S.E.C., Form D, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formd.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
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preemption. This result undermines the purpose of NSMIA, to make national 
securities markets simpler and more efficient by federalizing regulation.222  
Finally, although blue sky laws largely provide the same 
rescission remedy as federal law—forcing the issuer to return all 
amounts purchasers paid for the securities, plus interest—the state laws 
provide other remedies, which may amount to greater expenses to issuers 
than under federal law.223 For example, the Uniform Securities Act 
provides for payment of costs and attorneys fees for failure to register 
securities under state law, but the remedies under the Securities Act do 
not.224 Several states have adopted the Uniform Securities Act’s model 
remedies.225 The imposition of different remedies by different states for a 
failure to satisfy the Rule 506 conditions increases the costs of ensuring 
legal compliance of private offerings, encourages unnecessary and purely 
prophylactic registration, and undermines much of the efficiency and 
simplicity NMSIA purported to introduce to securities markets. 
C. Broad Construction of NSMIA’s Preemption Provision 
The broad construction of NSMIA’s preemption provision for 
private offerings is more consistent with the purpose of NSMIA and 
other securities regulations in achieving efficiency, objectivity, and, 
simplicity.226 Under the broad preemption standard, an issuer 
commencing a private offering pursuant to Rule 506 obtains the benefit 
of preemption simply by claiming the exemption in their offering 
documents.227 Some courts have held that blue sky laws are preempted 
once the issuer files Form D, the notice of sale pursuant to Regulation D.228  
Florida’s Southern District Court turned to the legislative intent 
to glean the appropriate preemption standard.229 The issuer in Temple v. 
Gorman sold shares of an online retailer to 112 investors in a Rule 506 
private offering.230 After the collapse of technology stocks between 1999 
and 2001, purchasers sought rescission of their purchases and sued the 
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exemption in its private placement memorandum. Id. 
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For a discussion of Form D, see supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text. 
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in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3878 (stating that NSMIA’s purpose is to federalize securities markets). 
 
230
 Temple, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 1239-40. 
504 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:2  
 
issuer for failing to register under Florida’s blue sky laws.231 The court 
cited Congressional Reports, in which the House Commerce Committee 
stated it “intends that the section 4(2) exemption from State regulation 
facilitate private placement of securities consistent with the public 
interest and the protection of investors.”232 Because the issuer had filed 
Form D and had issued the securities pursuant to Rule 506, the court held 
that the state could not demand a separate registration statement.233 
When the Florida District Court decided Temple, few doubted 
that Congress intended to provide expansive preemption in order to 
assume exclusive regulatory authority over national securities markets. 
The Second Circuit, in Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., noted 
that NSMIA and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 
(“SLUSA”)—which requires certain class action securities fraud cases to 
be litigated in federal courts234—are part of a common scheme to 
federalize regulation of certain nationally traded securities.235 One article 
from 1998 lamented the extinction of the blue sky lawyer, stating “[t]he 
chief cause of the decreased workload [for lawyers specializing in blue 
sky law] was the Congressional passage in 1996 of the National 
Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA). The legislation 
transferred the lion’s share of responsibility for securities regulation from 
individual states to the federal government.”236  
Many courts have also adopted a broad preemption standard. The 
North Dakota Federal District Court in Lillard v. Stockton agreed with 
the preemption standard established in Temple but had little other 
authority available.237 The District Court of Minnesota also adopted the 
broad preemption standard in Pinnacle Communications International, 
Inc. v. American Family Mortgage Corp., citing, as the court in Temple, 
the intent of the legislature.238 Most recently, a Minnesota appellate court 
adopted the broad preemption standard in Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, 
Inc.239 However, the Risdall court cited policy reasons for adopting broad 
preemption: federal courts interpreting federal law are better at deciding 
the issue of whether a Regulation D exemption is valid.240 In other words, 
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the broad preemption standard not only improves market efficiency, but 
also promotes judicial economy by barring multifarious pronouncements 
on Rule 506 and NSMIA from state-court judges.241  
While the broad preemption standard admittedly contradicts the 
plain language of the statute, it does not follow that Congress or the 
S.E.C. intended for NSMIA’s preemption provision for private offerings 
to be applied so narrowly. Congress left much to the discretion of the 
S.E.C. and purposefully included several lacunae for the S.E.C. to fill in 
order to best protect the interests of investors.242 Moreover, the legislative 
history is replete with references to acts by the commission to clarify the 
meaning of the act.243  
Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit’s argument in Brown that the 
S.E.C. imposed the Rule 506 conditions as a requirement of preemption 
is weak at best.244 While it is true that the S.E.C. has broad authority to 
define the breadth of the term “covered security,”245 the S.E.C. did not 
adopt Regulation D for the purpose of defining a class of “covered 
securities” to be exempt from blue sky laws. Congress defined “covered 
security” to include private offerings subject to preexisting and future 
regulatory exemptions.246 However, the S.E.C. tailored Rule 506 to 
facilitate compliance with the § 4(2) statutory private offering 
exemption,247 not to be a workable litmus test for preempting state 
securities law. The S.E.C. has yet even to define sales to “qualified 
purchasers,” an entire class of “covered securities,” which Congress 
provided specifically for the S.E.C. to define. 248 
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V. THE SAFE HARBOR SOLUTION—IMPROVEMENTS IN EFFICIENCY, 
OBJECTIVITY, AND SIMPLICITY 
The narrow preemption standard is antithetical to the principles 
of efficiency and simplicity espoused by the legislature upon enacting 
NSMIA. As discussed above in Part III, federal securities regulatory 
policy has always excluded private offerings from the burdensome 
registration and mandatory disclosure provisions of the Securities Act.249 
Part III.C provided evidence that Congress intended NSMIA to inject 
efficiency into securities regulation by assuming exclusive regulatory 
authority over private securities offerings.250 Part IV illustrated how the 
narrow preemption standard undermines the efficiency of securities 
markets and the judiciary by empowering states and state judges to 
establish local rules and remedies for unregistered private offerings that 
fail the Rule 506 conditions.251 The narrow preemption standard for 
private offerings is unreasonable and unsustainable because it reduces 
efficiency, adds new complexity to securities law, and provides no 
substantial protections for investors.  
In order to ensure a national standard that is efficient, objective, 
and simple, the S.E.C. should adopt a safe harbor provision for private 
offerings of securities. Because courts of several local jurisdictions may 
not be bound by each other’s interpretation of NSMIA,252 it is unlikely 
that we will see a judicial solution to this problem. The S.E.C., on the 
other hand, is given plenipotentiary authority under NSMIA to craft rules 
clarifying or defining the preemption standard.253 Section 19 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 provides the following: 
The Commission shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and 
rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the 
provisions of this subchapter, including rules and regulations governing 
registration statements and prospectuses for various classes of securities . . . .254 
Moreover, NSMIA itself added a provision specifically 
permitting the S.E.C. to define an entire class of securities for which 
state blue sky laws would be preempted:  
A security is a covered security with respect to the offer or sale of the security 
to qualified purchasers, as defined by the Commission by rule. In prescribing 
  
 
249
 See supra Parts III.A and III.B; Conference Report on the National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act of 1996, 142 Cong. Rec. S12093-02, at S12093 (Oct. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. D’Amato). 
 
250
 See supra Part III.C. 
 
251
 See supra Part IV. 
 
252
 See, e.g., Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, Inc., 733 N.W.2d 827, 832 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) 
(making an independent determination as to whether an issuer needs to prove exemption before 
proving preemption while acknowledging the countervailing authorities). 
 
253
 See 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (2006); see also S.E.C. v. Life Partners, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 4, 
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2009] AY DIOS NSMIA! 507 
 
such rule, the Commission may define the term “qualified purchaser” 
differently with respect to different categories of securities, consistent with the 
public interest and the protection of investors.255 
Accordingly, the S.E.C. need only draft a rule that is efficient, 
objective, and simple, while balancing investor protections.  
A broad preemption standard may be tailored as not to diminish 
investor protections or promote any fraudulent avoidance of blue sky 
laws. While this may seem to be a simple task, the S.E.C. should 
recognize that the narrow preemption standard does provide protections 
to investors. As discussed in Part IV.B, a broad preemption standard 
could permit any issuer to claim the Rule 506 private offering exemption 
in bad faith, or even ex post when confronted with a lawsuit.256 As 
discussed in Part III.C, Congress had good policy reasons for leaving 
regulation of certain securities to the states.257 One option would be to 
tailor the definition of “qualified purchaser” to include investors who 
purchase securities in a private offering pursuant to rules and regulations 
under § 4(2) of the Securities Act.258 Another would be to amend NSMIA 
to broaden the definition of “covered securities” to include those offered 
pursuant to rules and regulations under § 4(2) of the Securities Act.259 
However, these methods fail to avoid the potential abuse for those issuing 
securities not intended to be exempt from state regulation under NSMIA.  
An efficient safe harbor provision should aim at preempting state 
blue sky law for all private offerings of securities, with little left to 
judicial scrutiny. Accordingly, an efficient safe harbor provision should 
establish a set of conditions for the issuer to meet prior to issuing the securities 
in order to establish and provide notice of a bona fide private offering.  
Second, the conditions should be couched in objective, 
unambiguous terms. Former Rule 146 of the Securities Act was intended 
to facilitate compliance with the § 4(2) private offering standard 
established in the Ralston decision, but the rule failed because it required 
an issuer to determine the extent of each offeree’s knowledge, 
information, and business experience.260 An objective safe harbor 
provision, on the contrary, should inform the issuer immediately whether 
the blue sky law will be preempted with respect to the issuer’s offering, 
before a single security is sold. 
Finally, the provisions of the proposed safe harbor must be 
drafted simply, without complex requirements that would undermine the 
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purpose of simplifying the dual regulatory system. The safe harbor 
provision should not require complex filings or disclosures as a means of 
ensuring compliance with the Rule 506 private offering exemption.  
Instead, the proposed safe harbor provision should guarantee 
preemption once the issuer has (1) filed a Form D notice of sale with the 
S.E.C. and the state, (2) indicated on Form D that the securities are 
offered pursuant to Rule 506, and (3) issued written notice to the investor 
of the anticipated Rule 506 exemption, via private placement 
memorandum or otherwise. Such requirements would be efficient 
because they would effectively preempt blue sky laws for all bona fide 
private offerings. These requirements are objective because they allow 
issuers to conclude with certainty that they need not comply with blue 
sky regulations and do not involve any subjective inquiry as to the intent 
or knowledge of the issuer or investor. Additionally, these requirements 
are simple because issuers are already required to file Form D with the 
S.E.C., although not as a condition of exemption,261 and some states 
already require Form D for certain limited offerings.262  
Moreover, the safe harbor would not undermine investor 
protection. The Form D filing requirement avoids fraudulent attempts to 
escape blue sky laws when issuing non-exempt securities. In fact, the 
court in Temple looked to whether the issuer filed Form D as evidence of 
a bona fide private offering.263 The written notice requirement avoids ex 
post claims of a Rule 506 exemption. The court in Risdall looked to 
whether the issuer had indicated in their private placement memorandum 
to investors that the securities were offered pursuant to the Rule 506 
private offering exemption.264 Finally, those who abuse the safe harbor or 
fail the private offering exemption would still be subject to well-
established federal remedies.265 
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